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Cheryl Misak*
Language and Experience for Pragmatism
Abstract: It is sometimes said that contemporary pragmatists place too much 
emphasis on language and not enough on experience. This objection might hold 
for the pragmatism of Richard Rorty and his students, but it does not hold for the 
pragmatism of C. S.  Peirce, William James, and John Dewey. I shall argue that we 
should return to the classical pragmatists and their truth-and-experience position. 
Indeed, an important insight at the very heart of pragmatism is that language and 
experience cannot be pulled apart. 
1. Introduction
It is sometimes said that contemporary pragmatists place too much emphasis on 
language and not enough emphasis on the relationship between experience, thought 
and action1. This assertion seems to be justiied if we focus on the particular branch 
grafted onto the pragmatist tradition by Richard Rorty in the 1970s. One of his 
revolutionary moves was to demote experience from the place of importance given 
to it by the classical pragmatists – C.  S.  Peirce, William James, and John Dewey. 
“Experience”, Rorty thinks, is a term we should give up when we set out our views of 
truth, reality, and ethics. We should replace it with “discourse”. We should “Forget, for 
the moment, about the external world, as well as about that dubious interface between 
self and world called ‘perceptual experience’” (1991: 93). As his student and torch-
bearer Robert Brandom puts it: “‘experience’ is not one of my words” (2000: 205). 
In the Library of Living Philosophers volume on Rorty, put together just before he 
died in 2007, Rorty points in the direction he would like pragmatism to travel – the 
way Brandom’s “semantic inferentialism” (2010: 45). That position maintains that 
meaning consists in the inferential connections we make amongst beliefs. There is 
of course no mention of experience or the world. The world, Rorty thinks (repeating 
a phrase used by Nelson Goodman), is a world well-lost (1972).
It turns out that when experience is drained out of someone’s philosophical world-
view, “truth” is also not one of their words. Rorty puts it thus: “no one should even 
try to specify the nature of truth”2. Truth is nothing but disquotation: there is nothing 
more to saying “‘p’ is true” than removing the quotation marks and asserting p itself. 
Here is another student of Rorty’s, Michael Williams: “When we have pointed to 
certain features of the truth predicate (notably its ‘disquotational’ feature) and 
explained why it is useful to have a predicate like this (e.g. as a device for asserting 
ininite conjunctions), we have said just about everything there is to be said about 
truth” (1988: 424).
* Univesity of Toronto [cheryl.misak@utoronto.ca]
1. See, for instance Godfrey-Smith 2014.
2. See Rorty (1991: 3; 1986; 1995: 281–87).
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In my view, much of the damage Rorty has done to pragmatism comes from 
setting up a false choice between language or experience. Hence the title of this paper: 
“Language and Experience for Pragmatism”. It is not just that we can help ourselves 
to both if we want to. An important insight at the very heart of pragmatism is that 
language and experience cannot be pulled apart. 
2. Language and Experience in Peirce, James and Dewey
The founders of pragmatism thought of their position as evolving partly from 
British empiricism. While Peirce was also heavily inluenced by Kant, and Dewey by 
Hegel, it was the empiricism Alexander Bain, with his account of belief as a disposition 
to behave, that formed the center of the pragmatists position and method. Experience, 
for the classical pragmatists, was an essential notion. James, for instance, ever the 
“radical empiricist” was forever “remanding us to the sensation life” (1977: 118).
All the early pragmatists adopted one or another version of the pragmatic maxim, 
which requires beliefs and concepts to be linked to experience and action. As Peirce 
put it: we “must look to the upshot of our concepts in order to rightly apprehend them” 
(CP 5: 4); in order to get a complete grasp of a concept, we must connect it to that 
with which we have “dealings” (CP 5: 416). In other words, the classical pragmatists, 
wanted their explanations, ontology and philosophical theories to be connected to 
experience. 
But the classical pragmatists moved away from the empiricism of their predecessors 
in rejecting the idea that all meaningful beliefs and concepts can be reduced to and 
guaranteed by sensation. Dewey famously regrets the fact that Locke and the other 
British empiricists brought to philosophy the “spectator theory of knowledge”. 
Knowledge and human psychology, Dewey argued, are inextricably interwoven. 
To know something, or to have a belief about what you experience, is for all the 
pragmatists, bound up with our human capacities, interpretations, and categories. 
Once we bring an experience into the realm of comprehension, or understanding or 
belief, we can no longer make sense of the idea of an experience unaltered by us. An 
understood or comprehended experience is always a joint project between reality and 
the experiencer. We cannot think with Hume and Locke that “mental life originates 
in sensations which are separately and passively received, and which are formed, 
through laws of retention and association, into a mosaic of images, perceptions 
and conceptions” (MW  10:  12). We must think of experience, rather, as an active 
relationship between an organism and its environment. Our experiential judgments 
are laden with our concepts and interests. Perceivers do not passively absorb inputs 
from the external world. We impose human categories on experience. Subject and 
object merge in experience. Moreover, pragmatist empiricism “does not insist upon 
antecedent phenomena but upon consequent phenomena; not upon the precedents 
but upon the possibilities of action. And this change in point of view is almost 
revolutionary in its consequences” (LW 2: 12). Peirce and James, in slightly different 
vocabulary, put forward very similar rich conceptions of experience.
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Also into the dustbin went the narrow-mindedness that tends to walk hand and 
hand with the atomist version of empiricism. The early pragmatists rejected the idea 
that physical or sensory experience is what is relevant for meaning and truth. Value, 
generality, and intention they argued, must be seen as part of the natural world. They 
tried, each in their own way and with varying degrees of success, to widen the concept 
of experience and bring under the scope of truth and knowledge. Our cognitive capacity 
covers not just science, but also logic, mathematics, art, religion, ethics, and politics. 
It will not be surprising that the early pragmatists all rejected the idea that there 
is a tight connection between truth and the external world. When Peirce turns his 
pragmatic maxim on the concept of truth, the upshot is an aversion to “transcendental” 
accounts of truth, such as the correspondence theory, on which a true belief is one that 
corresponds to, or gets right, or mirrors the believer- independent world (CP  5: 572). 
Such accounts of truth are examples of “vagabond thoughts that tramp the public 
roads without any human habitation” (CP 8: 112). They make truth the subject of 
empty metaphysics. For the very idea of the believer-independent world, and the 
items within it to which beliefs or sentences might correspond, seems graspable only 
if we could somehow step outside our corpus of belief, our practices, or that with 
which we have dealings. The correspondence concept of truth fails to make “readily 
comprehensible” the fact that we aim at the truth or at getting things right (CP 1: 578). 
How could anyone aim for a truth that goes beyond what we can experience or beyond 
the best that inquiry could do? How could an inquirer adopt a methodology that might 
achieve that aim? The correspondence theory makes truth “a useless word” and 
“having no use for this meaning of the word ‘truth’, we had better use the word in 
another sense” (CP  5: 553). Again, one can ind similar thoughts in James and Dewey. 
The early pragmatists are set against what we now call representationalist theories 
of truth – theories that take truth to be a matter of words representing, mirroring, or 
copying reality. 
Peirce is the early pragmatist who spends the most time telling us what kind of 
theory of truth we should adopt. He offers us a complex way of understanding the 
concept of truth, on which correspondence is acceptable as a “nominal” deinition of 
it, useful (only) to those who have never encountered the word before (CP  8:  100). 
But he argues that we want an account of truth that goes beyond a mere deinition. We 
want an account of truth that is useful in inquiry and to those who already are familiar 
with the concept. Hence, we need to provide a pragmatic elucidation – an account of 
the role the concept plays in practical endeavors. We need to illuminate the concept of 
truth by considering its linkages with inquiry, assertion, and acquisition of belief, for 
those are the human dealings relevant to truth. He argues that the linkage is as follows: 
a true belief is one that would be successful in a robust way – it would best account of 
all experience, were we able to inquire as far as we could on the matter. It would be 
“indefeasible” (CP 5: 569). 
Dewey puts a different spin on this idea. Inquiry is a matter of an organism trying 
to maintain stability or harmony in its environment. The organism faces a problematic 
situation – instability or lack of equilibrium – and tries to resolve it. A warranted 
belief is one that can solve a problem (MW  4:  64; LW  12:  15). And James, although 
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ISSN: 2036-4091               2014, VI, 2
31
he sometimes adopts Peirce’s view, is inclined towards the idea that truth is what 
works for an individual. They were all resolute empiricists and it would seem that if 
you don’t like empiricism, you shouldn’t like pragmatism.
3. The Challenge
The problem faced by all empiricists, and really, by every philosopher, is how to 
make sense of the relationship between our beliefs and reality. The answer for the 
kind of philosopher who argues that we cannot break out of the circle of language 
to even gesture at reality, is one way of responding to this problem. But for the early 
pragmatists, it is the rich conception of experience that is supposed to get us to the 
answer. Let us take Peirce as an example, but again, the argument could be made 
for James and Dewey as well. Experience, for Peirce, is that which impinges upon 
us and gives us indexical access to the world. He says: “Now the ‘hardness’ of fact 
lies in the insistency of the percept, its entirely irrational insistency, the element of 
Secondness in it. That is a very important factor of reality” (CP  7:  659). But this 
indexical pointing to reality is very thin. As soon as we form an experiential judgment, 
we  have interpreted what impinged upon us. We must take the force of experience as 
it comes and then subject our subsequent experiential judgments to critical scrutiny. 
Experience can be had in diagrammatic contexts (hence mathematics and logic pass 
the test) and in thought experiments (hence moral, political, and aesthetic judgments 
might well pass the test).
It is interesting that Peirce thought that Hegel had things right, but for the fact that 
he whitewashed out the category of immediacy or Secondness: 
The truth is that pragmaticism is closely allied to the Hegelian absolute idealism, from 
which, however, it is sundered by its vigorous denial that the third category...sufices to 
make the world, or is even so much as self-suficient. Had Hegel, instead of regarding 
the irst two stages with his smile of contempt, held on to them as independent or 
distinct elements of the triune Reality, pragmatists might have looked up to him as the 
great vindicator of their truth. (CP 5: 436; 1904)
Hegel, that is, failed to take seriously the brute clash between perceivers and the 
world. He needed to be “educated in a physical laboratory instead of in a theological 
seminary” (CP 8: Bibliography). He would say the same thing about Rorty and all of 
those who follow him in not taking experience to be one of their words.
But Peirce’s solution to the challenge faced by empiricism (a solution I have merely 
given the barest outline of) did not catch the attention of many of his successors. Peirce 
was hardly known by philosophers in his time and is hardly known by philosophers 
these days. He was a dificult man and his career was a stunted one. And the views of 
James and Dewey each contained elements that obfuscated appreciation of their views 
(James a tendency to put his view in subjectivist terms and Dewey a tendency to put 
his view in Hegelian terms)3. Perhaps if Peircean pragmatism had been in the air in 
3. See Misak 2013 for the full story.
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the next stage of empiricist philosophy, the revolution and the excising of experience 
would not have seemed necessary to Rorty.
For that next stage was the logical atomism of Bertrand Russell and then the 
logical empiricism of the Vienna Circle. Russell argued that sensation is a relationship 
– a relationship of “acquaintance” – between the mind and the world. This empiricist 
claim could well be absorbed by the empiricism of pragmatism, and indeed, Russell 
takes the language of “acquaintance” from James’s Principles of Psychology, where 
James says “Sensations irst make us acquainted with innumerable things, and then are 
replaced by thoughts which know the same things in altogether other ways” (James 
1891: 6), and “We can only think or talk about the relations of objects with which we 
have acquaintance already” (James 1891: 3).
But Russell goes on to outline a foundationalist view that he explicitly set against 
pragmatism:
The philosophy which seems to me closest to the truth can be called “analytic realism”. 
It is realist, because it claims that there are non-mental entities and that cognitive 
relations are external relations, which establish a direct link between the subject and 
a possibly non-mental object. It is analytic, because it claims that the existence of 
the complex depends on the existence of the simple, and not vice versa, and that the 
constituent of a complex, taken as a constituent, is absolutely identical with itself as 
it is when we do not consider its relations. The philosophy is therefore an atomistic 
philosophy. (Russell 1992: 133)
He was of the view that in a logically perfect, scientiic, and transparent language, 
philosophers could solve all the old problems. Rorty says “Neither William nor Henry 
James would have had anything to say in a world without Russell” (1982: 160, 136). 
This is rather strained, since the James’s were putting their ideas forward before 
Russell came on the scene. But there was indeed some recoiling done on all sides. On 
the pragmatist’s part, the quest for certainty, and the seeking of it in experience, was 
misguided.
Notoriously, neither Russell nor the logical empiricists who succeeded him could 
make good on their promises. The strong atomistic program disintegrated, after failed 
attempts to say just what it was in the world that our experiences were supposed to 
hook onto and just how our experiences were supposed to do that. Wittgenstein was 
one of those who leveled devastating criticisms of the strong program. We can straight 
away see why the critic of the strong program might warn against taking experience 
to be central in epistemology, for it appears that experience is one of the main culprits 
in the problematic view. 
But it is here that the story starts to spell trouble, or at least get interesting in a 
way that must be worrying for the anti-empiricist kind of pragmatist. Two of Russell’s 
colleagues opposed his view in the 1920s. One was Wittgenstein. The other was the 
young and brilliant Frank Ramsey, who was to die at the age of 26 in 1930. Rorty 
and Brandom ind their inspiration in the former4. But the debate between Ramsey 
4. The reader who wonders how Ramsey and Wittgenstein could possibly be called pragmatists will 
ind the answer in my Cambridge Pragmatism (forthcoming).
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and Wittgenstein for the heart and soul of pragmatism is a debate that we pragmatists 
ignore at our peril.
4. Wittgenstein and the Focus on Language Games
The early Wittgenstein seemed mightily attracted to the Russellian atomistic view. 
In the 1921 Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, he sets out the grammar or structure of 
logic and language. He could not sound more like Russell when he asserts: “The way 
in which objects hang together in the atomic fact is the structure of the atomic fact” 
(T: 2.032). He presents us with a “picture theory” of meaning, on which a picture 
represents that objects are a certain way and there is a representing relation between 
the picture and the objects. The world, he maintains, consists of facts. The simplest 
facts – “states of affairs” or “atomic facts” – are meldings of absolutely simple 
objects. Wittgenstein thus puts forward a version of the correspondence theory of 
truth on which facts are entities in their own right, composed of particulars, properties, 
relations and universals. 
But at the very end of the Tractatus, he advises us to use the structure as a ladder 
and then kick it out from under us. At the very end of the Tractatus, that is, Wittgenstein 
signals a major change of mind approach, and it is that approach that he is now known 
for. It was a clear rejection of the atomistic view and while Wittgenstein himself did 
not entirely excise the concept of experience from that later philosophy, he sets the 
stage for his followers to do so. The following passage does a remarkable job in 
summing up a view that resists quick characterization:
It is very dificult to talk about the relation of language to reality without talking 
nonsense or without saying too little. I do not now have phenomenological language, 
or “primary language” as I used to call it, in mind as my goal. I no longer hold it to be 
necessary. All that is possible and necessary is to separate what is essential from what 
is inessential in our language. (Wittgenstein 2000, MS 107: 205)
One way of dealing with the dificulties of making the atomistic position work is 
to give up on it and on the entire project of trying to set out the relationship between 
language and the world. Thus we have Wittgenstein’s End-Of-Philosophy gesture, 
an attempt to bring philosophy to a close. The philosopher must advance no theses 
(PI: § 128) but assemble “reminders for a particular purpose” (§ 127); namely to 
attain “a clear view of the use of our words” (§ 122). This way we “battle against the 
bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language” (§ 109), so that we should 
be “capable of stopping doing philosophy” when we want to (§ 133). This is the 
Wittgenstein that Rorty was attracted to. 
Wittgenstein, in his last work, On Certainty, said “So I am trying to say something 
that sounds like pragmatism. Here I am being thwarted by a kind of Weltanschauung” 
(OC: 422). What he might have meant by that last sentence is that the “worldview” of 
pragmatism is a theory and Wittgenstein only wanted a method of doing philosophy. 
That is, it is the Weltanscahulicher character of pragmatism (its “ism”) disturbs him. 
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Or he might meant that, in his view, pragmatism was a materialist reduction of value 
or the normative to behavior or action. 
Either way, he got pragmatism very wrong. Peirce and James were explicit that 
pragmatism was a irst and foremost a method and neither went near reductive 
materialism. Nonetheless, it is the revolutionary thought of Wittgenstein’s that Rorty 
took on and labeled “pragmatism”. This new pragmatism became the view that it is 
pointless to talk about matters such as truth or rationality. The problems of philosophy 
are linguistic in nature. In the preface to Philosophy as Cultural Politics, Rorty sums 
up his view as: “Hegelian historicism and a Wittgensteinian ‘social practice’ approach 
to language complement and reinforce one another” (2007: ix). He tries brings James 
and Dewey on board as well, although as we have seen, they thought that philosophy 
was not all about language – it was about language and experience. Had they still 
been alive (like Quine and Davidson, who Rorty also tried to enroll in his program), 
I submit they would have declined the invitation.
Those who did come on board argue that it is our whole grasp of things that  we 
must focus on, rather than worrying about guaranteeing the small bits so that  we 
can demarcate a certain and pristine domain of knowledge. For this branch of 
Wittgensteinian pragmatists, we make judgments always within a social context. 
Meaning is use and we should not worry about how experience connects those 
judgments with the world, nor should we fuss about the notions of truth or falsity. We 
believe what we believe. The Wittgenstein-inspired pragmatist denies, in Brandom’s 
words, that “linguistic practices and the vocabularies caught up in them.typically admit 
of speciication in terms of underlying principles speciiable in other vocabularies”. 
Linguistic practice is, rather, “essentially dynamic” and “what practical extensions 
of a given practice are possible for the practitioners can turn on features of their 
embodiment, lives, environment, and history that are contingent and wholly particular 
to them” (Brandom 2008: 5-6). 
One of the troubles that plagues this view is the quietism that seems to follow from 
directly upon its heels – a quietism that Wittgenstein himself endorsed. Once we have 
so thoroughly contextualized meaning and truth, it seems that there is nothing we can 
say about how to evaluate this or that claim to meaning and truth. All we can say is 
what Wittgenstein and Rorty say: is this is our practice, this is our stance, this is where 
my spade turns, this is what my peers let me get away with saying. But the worry is: if 
it’s all a matter of language, then how can we adjudicate between inconsistent views? 
I have argued elsewhere5 that this quietism is dangerous and makes no sense at all 
of our practices. It is dangerous because it gives us nothing to say to ourselves and to 
others when we encounter someone or some community whose spade turns, for instance, 
on the aim of installing substantive homogeneity in the population by eliminating the 
“other”. And when we assert, believe, inquire, deliberate, learn from experience, revise 
and improve our beliefs, we betray the fact that we are not simply bound up in a cultural 
language game. For what it is to make an assertion or inquire into a matter is to take our 
beliefs to be responsive to experience and argument for or against it. 
5. I irst started arguing this in Misak 2000, and most recently in Misak 2013b.
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Is there really no pragmatist position that lets us escape the deeply unattractive 
reductionist, atomist positions, without tossing us into a sea of arbitrariness? The 
answer to that question has already been given – Peirce started us on the right path. One 
great and terribly underappreciated pragmatist who continued on it was C.  I.  Lewis. 
The reader may want to turn to my The American Pragmatists to see how he gives the 
pragmatist a conception of values on which human beings are the judges of what is 
right and wrong, but that does not entail that “the evaluations which the fool makes in 
his folly are on a par with those of the sage in his wisdom” (1971: 398-99). But here 
I will be focused on Peirce’s other successor, Frank Ramsey, who was engaged with 
Russell and Wittgenstein at just the moment when Wittgenstein turned away from 
logical atomism and toward his revolutionary and quietist brand of pragmatism.
5. Ramsey: Belief, Behavior and Experience
As Wittgenstein was making his transition from the atomism of the Tractatus to 
the more radical view of the Philosophical Investigations and On Certainty, his friend 
and philosophical interlocutor, Frank Ramsey, was putting forward a different kind of 
pragmatist position. When he took ill with hepatitis and died at the age of 26, Ramsey had 
made his mark not just on his colleagues Cambridge, but also, indelibly, on a number of 
disciplines. In his brief life, he laid the groundwork for decision theory and game theory; 
founded a branch of mathematics and two branches of economics; made contributions to 
logic, the foundations of mathematics, semantics, philosophy of science, and the theory 
of truth. What is less known is that Ramsey was heavily inluenced by Peirce6. 
Ramsey, with the classical pragmatists, took at least one important message from 
the old British empiricism – Bain’s dispositional account of belief. He argued that 
once we understand that beliefs are habits of action, we will see the need to rethink 
our concepts of meaning and truth. His thoughts on this matter appear in an interesting 
interregnum period – just before the broad and plausible veriicationism of Peirce was 
over-run by the narrow and far less plausible veriicationism of the logical empiricists. 
Once the logical empiricists had captured the term, it was unusable for generations. 
In “Facts and Propositions”, Ramsey articulates a dispositionalist account of belief 
on which beliefs are individuated by their causes and their effects, the latter being 
dispositions to behave. We can, of course, construct sentences “which express no 
attitude of belief at all”, but these should not be regarded as “signiicant” (FP: 47). He 
agrees with Wittgenstein that “formal logic”, for instance, is composed of tautologies: 
statements such as “p or not-p” can be added to any sentence without altering their 
meaning. Similarly, “p and not-p”: it excludes every possibility and thus “expresses 
no attitude”. That is, beliefs that have no function or no relation to experience have no 
meaning. Ramsey’s functionalism, however, is not a reductionist kind of behaviorism. 
He is on the same page as Peirce. He does not want to explain away mental states. He 
thinks they exist and are important. But he thinks that you cannot understand mental 
states without understanding their causes and their behavioral effects. 
6. For the whole fascinating story, see Misak (forthcoming).
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Ramsey is usually taken to be a straight redundancy theorist about truth. Hence, 
those who would like to do without experience and truth tend to be fans of his. 
But he is very clear that one must not stop with the redundancy theory. “Facts and 
Propositions” begins with the statement: “The problem with which I propose to deal 
is the logical analysis of what may be called by any of the terms judgment, belief, or 
assertion”. When I believe that Caesar was murdered, it seems that I have on the one 
hand something mental – “my mind, or my present mental state, or words and images 
in my mind” – and on the other hand something “objective” – “Caesar, or Caesar’s 
murder, or Caesar and murder, or the proposition Caesar was murdered, or the fact 
that Caesar was murdered” (FP: 34). My belief or judgment seems to involve some 
relation between the mental and the objective factors. Ramsey then makes a famous 
delationary remark about truth:
there is really no separate problem of truth but merely a linguistic muddle...“It is true 
that Caesar was murdered” means no more than that Caesar was murdered, and “It is 
false that Caesar was murdered” means that Caesar was not murdered. (FP: 38)
But Ramsey thinks that once you have laid out the matter in this way, what is 
clear is that the irst problem to tackle is not the nature of truth, but the nature of 
belief, judgment or assertion. He prefaces his delationary remark with “But before we 
proceed further with the analysis of judgment” and inishes the whole discussion with 
“if we have analysed judgment we have solved the problem of truth” (FP: 39). That 
is, the delationary move must be followed by an examination of belief, judgment, 
and assertion, and once that is undertaken, we will understand something about truth. 
When Ramsey conducts that analysis, he inds, like Peirce, that we ought to be 
unwilling to abandon the distinction between language and reality, although we must 
get rid of the problematic version of it that underlies the atomist picture. Ramsey 
says his view is “superior” to the correspondence theory because it “is able to avoid 
mentioning either correspondence or facts”, two philosophically problematic notions 
(OT: 90). Not only is there a worry about disjunctive facts (if I believe that Jones is a 
liar or a fool, how am I to construe the “either-or” fact that he is a liar or a fool?), but 
we cannot make good sense of the idea that a proposition can broken down into simple 
constituents that hook onto reality.
Ramsey proceeds with his examination of belief or judgment. If a chicken 
“believes” that a certain caterpillar is poisonous, it abstains from eating that kind of 
caterpillar on account of the unpleasant experiences associated with eating them: 
The mental factors in such a belief would be parts of the chicken’s behaviour, which are 
somehow related to the objective factors, viz. the kind of caterpillar and poisonousness. 
An exact analysis of this relationship would be very dificult, but it might well be held 
that in regard to this kind of belief the pragmatist view was correct, i.e. that the relation 
between the chicken’s behaviour and the objective factors was that the actions were 
such as to be useful if, and only if, the caterpillars were actually poisonous. Thus any 
set of actions for whose utility p is a necessary and suficient condition might be called 
a belief that p, and so would be true if p, i.e. if they are useful. (FP: 40)
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Pragmatism, for Ramsey, is the view that a belief is individuated by the actions 
it entails and that if a belief leads to successful action, it is true. And, importantly, 
successful action must be caused by the facts being as they are. He says:
The essence of pragmatism I take to be this, that the meaning of a sentence is to be 
deined by reference to the actions to which asserting it would lead, or more vaguely 
still, by its possible causes and effects. Of this I feel certain, but of nothing more 
deinite. (FP: 51)
How much better off pragmatism would have been if it followed Ramsey down 
the road of linking belief, fact and action. How different the trajectory of pragmatism 
would have been had the manuscript that Ramsey was working on when he died, 
titled On Truth, been inished and had seen the light of day. In that manuscript, 
Ramsey argues, with Peirce that, as long as it is taken in a commonsense way, the 
correspondence idea does no harm (OT: 90). He thinks that “a belief is true if it is 
a belief that p, and p” – “is merely a truism, but there is no platitude so obvious 
that eminent philosophers have not denied it” (OT: 12). It is “so obvious that one is 
ashamed to insist upon it, but our insistence is rendered necessary by the extraordinary 
way in which philosophers produce deinitions of truth in no way compatible with our 
platitudes” (OT: 13).
But we can only adopt the truism “in a vague sense” (OT: 11). We cannot be precise 
about what correspondence to reality is – we just get ourselves in a lot of philosophical 
trouble if we try to do so. The correspondence idea is at best a “cumbrous”, inexact 
idea and at worst, a “misleading” or “illegitimate” interpretation of the truism7. 
Ramsey turns his back on the idea that Wittgenstein and Rorty recoiled from – the 
idea that we can get beliefs that hook onto the world.
But Ramsey would have been appalled at the pragmatism of the later Wittgenstein 
and Rorty, and indeed, he was appalled by the manifestations of that view in day. 
James, he says, seems to deny the truism. He seems to deine truth as “the expedient 
in the way of our thinking” – a passage Ramsey quotes from James’s Pragmatism. 
It seems, that is, that James is committed to the possibility that someone “could think 
both that Shakespeare’s plays were written by Bacon and that someone else’s opinion 
that Shakespeare wrote them might be perfectly true ‘for him’” (OT: 15), a thought 
Ramsey takes from James The Meaning of Truth. Similarly, the coherence theorists 
also seem to deny the truism. They fail to speak of truth: “The beliefs of a man suffering 
from persecution mania may rival in coherence those of many sane men but that does 
not make them true” (OT: 94). The coherence theory is “absolutely irreconcilable” with 
the truism. The pragmatist need not hold that “p is true” is identiied with “p is useful”. 
Ramsey, like Peirce, wanted to articulate an account of truth in which “copying and 
pragmatism are both elements in the true analysis which is exceedingly complicated” 
(OT: 42) and which experience and language each play a central role. He and Peirce 
thought that philosophers cannot pull apart the content and truth of a belief from 
its experiential consequences. A wave of philosophers has picked up Wittgenstein’s 
7. See (OT: 12, 19, 23, 90).
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thought that all we need is language. Perhaps a new wave of pragmatists will pick up 
where Ramsey left off and give us that necessarily complicated account of truth and 
its relation to experience and behavior.
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